Section 183: Work Horse or Hobby Loss by Condon, Thomas A.
Catholic University Law Review 
Volume 20 
Issue 4 Summer 1971 Article 4 
1971 
Section 183: Work Horse or Hobby Loss 
Thomas A. Condon 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Thomas A. Condon, Section 183: Work Horse or Hobby Loss, 20 Cath. U. L. Rev. 716 (1971). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol20/iss4/4 
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Catholic University Law Review by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact edinger@law.edu. 
Comment
Section 183: Work Horse or Hobby Loss
The income tax laws of this country represent a compromise among varied
and conflicting interests. As these interests multiply, the volume of income
tax laws increases and becomes more complex to accommodate the inevitable
conflicts among these interests. One authority, Louis Eisenstein, has
classified the forces behind the enactment of tax laws as "conflicting ideolo-
gies."' As battles are won by different ideologies, our tax law maze gets
worse:
The power to tax is the power to reallocate the distribution of
worldly goods among different groups in our society. Every tax
system necessarily affects that distribution, whether or not it is
expressly designed to do so. Therefore, our income tax is doomed
to be an elaborate hodgepodge as long as it represents an uneasy
compromise among contending interests. 2
These "contending interests" were in plain view during the most recent con-
gressional attempt, of a large magnitude, to create a more equitable income
tax law. The Tax Reform Act of 1969,3 while closing and minimizing cer-
tain loopholes or preferences, 4 opened others.5 The new provisions of the
Act are a mixture of highly technical and complex laws6 which affects a small
number of specially situated taxpayers, and non-technical provisions which
affect a large portion of all taxpayers. 7 The subject of this comment is a pro-
vision that falls somewhere in the middle: new Code Section 183.8
Section 183 and its predecessors9 have come to be known as "hobby loss"
1. Eisenstein, Some Second Thoughts on Tax Ideologies, N.Y.U. 23D INST. ON
FED. TAX. 1, 10 (1965).
2. Id. at 3.
3. PuB. L. No. 91-172, Dec. 30, 1969, amending INT. REV. CODE of 1954 [here-
inafter cited as I.R.C. as amended].
4. I.R.C. as amended §§ 301, 211.
5. Id. § 804.
6. Id. § 101.
7. Id. § 801, 802.
8. Id. § 183.
9. INT. REV. CODE of 1939, § 130; INr. REV. CODE of 1954, § 270.
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provisions. They were enacted to curtail or severely limit the practice of off-
setting losses incurred in hobby-like activities against income from the tax-
payers principal business or the source of his livelihood. This was done be-
cause some taxpayers were enjoying their sports, hobbies, or avocations at
the expense of the federal revenue. 10 While Section 183 applies to any ac-
tivity not engaged in for profit," the Congress and Treasury apparently con-
sider it particularly applicable to gentleman farming. 12 This is indicated by its
placement in the Tax Reform Act under Subtitle B-Farm Losses, etc.13 It
should be noted that although many examples of court cases may be couched
in terms of farmers, horsemen and cattlemen, the principles applied to them
are equally applicable to any activity capable of being considered a hobby.
Before enactment of Section 183, there were two methods used by the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue to disallow deductions from a hobby-like
activity that would otherwise offset other ordinary income.
The method most frequently used was the application against the taxpayer
of Sections 165, 162 and 212 and the regulations thereunder. 14 These sec-
tions provided for the deduction of losses, trade or business expenses, or ex-
penses incurred for the production of income during a taxable year. These
sections and the regulations indicated that a profit intent was required for
the deduction of certain losses as well as for the deduction of expenses
either incurred in a trade or business or for the production of income. The
courts in disallowing deductions under these sections would merely find
that the taxpayer's operations were carried on primarily as a sport, hobby,
or recreation and without the requisite profit intent.' 5 As will be pointed out,
this method and the pertinent court cases interpreting it form the body and
perhaps the soul of the new Section 183.
The second possible means of disallowing hobby-like deductions was af-
forded by Section 270. This section, however, did not apply only to hobbies.
It applied to any activity which incurred the specified amount of consecutive
losses. The effectiveness of this section and its predecessors will also be dis-
cussed to give the proper background for understanding Section 183 because
it would appear that many of the regulations and cases under Section 270 still
have vitality.
10. Sharpe, New 'Hobby Loss' Rule is Tougher but Engaged in for Profit Dilemma
Remains, 32 J. TAx. 289 (1970).
11. I.R.C. as amended § 183(a).
12. Hearings on H.R. 13270 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. 34-36 (1969).
13. Pub. L. No. 91-172, Title II, Subtitle B.
14. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.165-1(e)(1)-(2), 1.165-6 (1960); Treas. Reg. § 1.162-12
(1961); Treas. Reg. § 1.212-(c) (1957).
15. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-12 (1961); Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1(c) (1957).
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There are no explanations in the Code or in the various Committee Re-
ports which specify or identify any kind of deduction which was allowable
prior to the enactment of Section 183 but which is not allowable now. Ap-
parently, any item which passes the deduction tests applicable to other Code
provisions also will pass the tests of Section 183. Because of this, it becomes
obvious that Section 183 is a "taxpayer provision" since there is nothing new
in the law which adversely affects the taxpayer. The Congress may have
codified some case law and regulation, but it was all there before. Section
183 merely appears to codify the Treasury's general policy which had al-
lowed "netting". 16 What Section 183 has done is to put forth a presumption
which is to operate in the taxpayer's favor.17
It is difficult at this time to guess how the regulations will interpret Section
183. It would appear that the Senate Finance Committee expected an ex-
tensive interpretative job from the Treasury Department. The Finance Com-
mittee report indicated that concern had been expressed as to whether there
would be reasonable administration of the new law. With this in mind, the
Finance Committee suggested that, "the Treasury Department should estab-
lish two advisory groups drawn from the cattle and horse industries . . .to
assist the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in establishing standards for
the application of these rules [section 183] to achieve reasonable results
and to resolve policy questions in their application from time to time."' 8
The Commissioner, in compliance with the Finance Committee request,
announced the formation of advisory committees from the horse industry' 9
and the cattle industry20 and stated "[a] primary purpose of the commit-
tee[s] will be to apply . . . [their] special expertise to counseling the IRS
in implementing important changes in the tax law. .... ,,2" It is hoped that
the Commissioner, with the help of these advisory groups, can produce work-
able regulations to help the taxpayer make an informed and certain appraisal
of his tax status as affected by Section 183. It certainly would be a pleasant
change if Section 183 could be saved from an existence similar to the many
other Code sections which led Mr. Eisenstein to make the following com-
ment: "The Internal Revenue Code, indeed, is a remarkable essay in sus-
16. Treas. Reg. § 1-162-12 (1961); see YOUR FEDERAL INCOME TAx 27, (1971 ed.);
the term "netting" is normally used to refer to the process of allowing deductions to
the extent of the income from the activity thereby eliminating any effect of the activity
in the taxpayers return.
17. I.R.C. as amended § 183(d).
18. S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 103 (1969).
19. I.R.S. NEws RELEASE, I.R.-1076 (October 30, 1970).
20. I.R.S. NEWS RELEASE, I.R.-1075 (October 30, 1970).
21. Id.
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tained obscurity. It has all the earmarks of a conspiracy in restraint of un-
derstanding. ''22
Background and The Ineffectiveness of Section 183's Predecessors
Enacted in 1943, Section 130 denied a deduction from gross income for the
excess of annual losses over $50,00023 when the losses from the trade or busi-
ness exceeded that amount for five consecutive years. 24 Not all the deduc-
tions allowable to the taxpayer were included in the computation of this
$50,000 amount however.25 In the event the test was met, the taxable
income of the individual was to be recomputed for each of the five consecu-
tive taxable years. 26 In this recomputation, deductions were allowed to the
extent of $50,000 plus the gross income derived from the trade or business.27
After taxable income for each of the five years was recomputed, the tax
for each year was redetermined on the basis of the revised taxable income 28
and for any of the above taxable years deficiencies were assessable, they
would all be assessed and collected in one taxable year. In this regard, an
extension of the statute of limitations was provided for the effective operation
of this provision. This provision kept all taxable years open in the five
consecutive taxable years until one year after the normal statute of limitations
for the fifth of the five consecutive taxable years had run. 29
The many failures of this provision should have been abundantly clear
when the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 was enacted. In spite of this, the
above rules were re-enacted substantially unchanged.30 Congress only felt a
need to exclude additional allowable deductions (specially treated deduc-
tions) from the loss incurred for the purposes of the $50,000 tests previously
mentioned. 31 An analysis of these specially treated deductions indicates an
22. A. EISENSTEIN, IDEOLOGIES OF TAXATION (1961).
23. INT. REV. CODE of 1939, § 130. [Hereinafter cited as I.R.C. 19391.
24. Id. § 130(a).
25. Id. Taxes and interest deductions were excluded for the purposes of the
$50,000 loss test.
26. Id. § 130(b).
27. Id. § 130(a).
28. Id. § 130.
29. Id. § 130(c).
30. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 270.
31. Id. Section 270 added to the list of specially treated deductions the following:
I. Casualty and abandonment losses connected with the trade or business de-
ductible under § 165 (c) (I );
2. Losses and expenses of the trade or business of farming which are directly
attributable to drought;
3. The net operating losses allowed under § 172;
4. Expenditures (such as research and experimental expenditures) which at
the taxpayer's option may be either deducted as expenses when incurred or
capitalized.
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intention on the part of Congress to remove from the potential application of
the "hobby loss" provision those deductible items which might occur by rea-
son of events beyond the taxpayer's control or which might occur in an un-
usually risky business. 32 The reason behind the special treatment of the net
operating loss was somewhat different, however:
In addition to the changes made by the House Bill, your Commit-
tee has provided that the net operating loss deduction is not to be
taken into account in determining whether a taxpayer's losses from
a trade or business exceed $50,000 for five consecutive years.
Otherwise, an unusually large loss in one year might have the effect
of creating losses in five consecutive years and bringing the tax-
payer within the application of this provision . 3
After Section 270 or its predecessor had been in existence for twenty-six
years, the Congress finally decided the results they had hoped for were not
materializing. As stated in identical language in both the Senate and House
Committee Reports:
The hobby loss provision generally has been of very limited ap-
plication. It is often possible for a taxpayer to slightly rearrange
his income and deductions so as to break the reqired string of
five years. In addition, exclusion of certain specially treated de-
ductions from the loss computations means that a number of ex-
penses are not considered to give rise to a loss even though
they are, in fact, deducted. Moreover, in the few cases in which
the hobby loss provision has applied so as to disallow the deduc-
tion of the loss, the taxpayer has been faced in one year with a
combined additional tax attributable to a five-year period.34
With these broad assertions, the Congress changed weapons and moved
steadily ahead in the attempt to curtail or minimize the use of hobby losses.
The Congress evidently had not been asleep the last twenty-six years. They
were merely watching the courts and the Treasury Department deal with the
hobby loss problem in a different and more effective manner. Apparently,
the Congress heeded their experience, since their new weapon, Section 183,
was primarily a codification of old case law and regulations under the general
loss,35 the trade or business expenses,3 6 and expenses for the production of
income,3 7 sections of the Code.
A New Word in Town-Activity
The word "activity" appears in all four sections of the new hobby loss provi-
32. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1954).
33. Id.
34. Id. S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 103; H.R. REP. No. 91-413, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. 71 (1969).
35. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 165.
36. Id. § 162.
37. Id. § 212.
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sion, but the word is not defined. It does appear clear, however, that an
"activity" is the new basic unit of hobby loss law-a word of art to replace the
time-worn phrase "trade or business".
The wording of the new section suggests that the test of profit intent and
all the other new rules will be applied separately to each distinct activity.
Herein lies the problem. What is an activity? The word "activity" appears
to be a compromise word used by the draftsmen because they could not use
the very term they wanted to define, "trade or business". On the surface,
the word "activity" would appear to have a more narrow definition than
trade or business, since in the generic sense each trade or business could carry
on several activities, but the contrary may also be true. It appears the non-
descriptive nature of the word "activity" may foster academic argument, but
the problem should be settled by the indication in the House Report that in
computing the amount of loss arising from the activity, ". . all deductions
attributable to the activity will be taken into account. As under present law,
[Section 270] the loss would be determinted separately with respect to each
activity carried on by the individual."'38 Therefore, it would appear that an
analysis of prior law will give us an idea of what the new regulation should
encompass to define an "activity".
The regulations under repealed Section 270 indicated that if an indi-
vidual carried on several trades or businesses, the deductions and income at-
tributable to each trade or business would not be aggregated for the purpose
of that Section's profit test.39  The regulations emphatically stated that,
". .. each trade or business shall be considered separately. '40  In this re-
gard, the trade or business carried on by the individual leading to the loss
had to be the same in each year to incur the Section 270 sanctions. 41 How-
ever, the mere use of different forms of carrying on the same business did not
prima facie create separate trades or businesses. If the taxpayer used part-
nership, joint venture, and sole proprietorship forms to carry on the same
business activity, all the individual's profits and losses from the activity were
aggregated to determine the applicability of the section. 42 The reason for this
is that the partnership or joint venture business was considered to be the
business of each partner to the extent of his distributive share. 43  The old
law, under Section 270, went so far as to state that if it was established for
tax purposes that a husband and wife were partners in the same trade or
38. H.R. REP. No. 91-413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 71 (1969).
39. Treas. Reg. § 1.270-1(a)(4) (1957).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. See also Rev. Rul. 221, 1953-2 CuM. BULL. 182.
43. Rev. Rul. 155, 1953-2 CuM. BuLL. 180.
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business or that they were acting independently of one another in the same
trade or business with his or her own money, they were to be considered as
involved in separate trades or businesses even if they filed a joint return. 44
Nor did the fact that several activities stemmed from a common commodity
or parcel of land make them one business:
Where several business activities emanate from a single com-
modity, such as oil and gas or a tract of land, it does not neces-
sarily follow that such activities are one business . . . . Where
it is shown that such business activities are separately conducted
and are not closely interrelated with each other, they are consid-
ered as separate business activities . .. 4
In two often cited cases on the point of separate businesses or activities,
the government's "one business" contention was not very successful. In
Davis v. Commissioner,46 the taxpayer carried on farming, livestock, and
packing activities through four proprietorships in Mexico, Texas, Florida,
and the Bahamas. The Commissioner alleged that the four proprietorships
constituted one business and therefore combined the individual losses, re-
sulting in dissallowance of deductions which exceeded the statutory amount. 47
The Commissioner used two criteria in arguing that the taxpayer's four ac-
tivities were but one business. The first was a so-called "nature test":
".. . activities which are the same or substantially similar in nature consti-
tute a single trade or business even where conducted at more than one loca-
tion."' 46  The second test asked the court to consider all the activities
carried on by the taxpayer as one business "unless they are separately
conducted for a bona fide business purpose."'49
The taxpayer, on the other hand, asserted the controlling test should be
whether or not there was a practical economic interrelationship between the
two agricultural enterprises.5 0 He stressed the geographical separation, inde-
pendent management and personnel, differences in markets, sources of sup-
ply and differing financial and economic problems. The court in the final
analysis, while citing many of the differences between the operations that
the taxpayer had noted, simply stated that based on the facts and circum-
stances of the case the activities constituted seperate businesses. While the
court stated the taxpayer's test was to be commended, it concluded it would
have found the same way under both of the Commissioner's tests.51
44. Treas. Reg. § 1.270-1(a)(4) (1957); Rev. Rul. 54-178, 1954-1 CuM. BULL. 128.
45. Rev. Rul. 55-121, 1955-1 CUM. BULL. 382-383.
46. 29 T.C. 878 (1958).
47. Id. at 888.
48. Id. at 887 (emphasis added).
49. Id. at 888.
50. Id.
51. id. at-.
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In the second case, Collins v. Commissioner,5 2 the court held that the tax-
payer's ownership and operation of two professional football teams, under
different franchises and in different but successive years, constituted separate
businesses, and the losses of one could not be tacked onto the losses of the
other. The Commissioner asserted that as in Davis, the nature of the busi-
nesses must be considered and if two enterprises of an individual are in the
same line of business, they should be treated as a single trade or business.
The court, in rejecting this test as conclusive, stated,
While the fact that an individual carries on two or more enter-
prises which engage in identical or similar activities may be a fac-
tor suggesting that the enterprises are in reality a single trade or
business, this fact may be outweighed by other considerations in a
given case. 53
Again, the court justified its result by noting such facts as the taxpayer's
separate books of accounts, separate bank accounts, separate management,
geographical differences, different offices and lack of economic or other in-
terrelationships. 54
From the above analysis of the law under Section 270, it would certainly
appear that we will see a lot of it in the new regulations under Section 183.
What the regulations will most likely do is make a general statement to the
effect that the question of what constitutes a separate activity will be de-
cided on its own facts and circumstances. The most important fact will most
likely be how the taxpayer has treated his operations. If they are treated
as one, for instance, then unless it can be shown that there is an artificial
grouping merely for tax avoidance, the taxpayer should prevail. The burden
of proof would apparently fall on the taxpayer whose claim to one or multi-
ple activities results in Section 183 not being applicable.
With this in mind, the taxpayer with a potential hobby loss problem should
be able to do some reliable tax planning. He should know the basic indicia
necessary to separate or consolidate his multiple operations. At the very
least, the taxpayer who wants to separate his operations should maintain
separate books of accounts, separate bank accounts, separate management
and separate employees where possible. Anything done by the taxpayer to
show his various operations are autonomous should be in the taxpayer's favor,
no matter how small.
Deductions Allowable-A Major Issue May Develop
The general thrust of Section 183 is that no deductions attributable to an ac-
52. 34 T.C. 592 (1960).
53. Id. at 597.
54. Id. at 597-98.
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tivity not engaged in for profit will be allowed except as further provided
within the Section.55 The exception provided codifies a rule which allows
the "netting" of income and deductions. 56 The wording of that exception
in Section 183(b) is as follows:
In the case of an activity not engaged in for profit to which subsection
(a) applies, there shall be allowed:
1. the deductions which would be allowable under this chapter
for the taxable year without regard to whether or not such
activity is engaged in for profit, and
2. a deduction equal to the amount of the deductions which
would be allowable under this chapter for the taxable year
only if such activity were engaged in for profit, but only to the
extent that the gross income derived from such activity for the
taxable year exceeds the deductions allowable by reason of
paragraph (1).1 7
The apparent purpose of this provision is to allow deductions up to the
amount of income derived from the activity which has already been deter-
mined not to be engaged in for profit. A problem arises, however, when
there are deductions which change character from those allowable under
Section 183(b)(1) to those allowable under Section 183(b)(2), depending
on whether the activity is engaged in for profit or not.
Deductions allowable under Section 183(b)(1) include interest, taxes
and the long-term capital gain deduction. Deductions allowable under Sec-
tion 183(b)(2) include any item deductible under any provision of the Code
for activities engaged in for profit. To illustrate the point, consider the
problem with the capital gains deduction. Although it is a deduction al-
lowable under Section 183(b) (1), how is the capital gain deduction com-
puted?
For example, assume the taxpayer has only two reportable transactions:
a long-term capital gain of $10,000 and a bad debt of $6,000. With these
facts in mind, compare the following two computations. For the first com-
putation, if the activity is treated as if it were engaged in for profit, then
the $10,000 long-term capital gain would not be netted against the $6,000
bad debt since the bad debt would constitute an ordinary deduction under
Section 162. The capital gain deduction would be taken first and only
$5,000 of income would remain. From this there would be taken the ordi-
55. I.R.C. as amended § 183(a).
56. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-12; see note 16 supra.
57. I.R.C. as amended § 183(b) (emphasis added). The underlined words in
this subsection indicate that the deductions allowable include interest, state taxes and
the capital gain deduction. The significance of these words will appear in the analysis
of the presumption to follow; see text accompanying note -, inf ra.
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nary deduction for the bad debt of $6,000 leaving a net loss of $1,000.
Therefore, the taxpayer would be allowed the $5,000 capital gain deduc-
tion and the $5,000 bad debt deduction to eliminate all taxable income from
the activity.
If the computation is made on the basis that the activity was not engaged
in for profit, however, the $6,000 bad debt would be treated as a short-term
capital loss which must be netted against the long-term capital gain before
arriving at the capital gain deduction. The result would be to have a net
long-term capital gain of $4,000 reduced by the capital gain deduction of
$2,000 leaving a net gain from the activity of $2,000.
Activity Engaged in for Profit Activity Not Engaged in for Profit
Long-term capital gain $10,000 Long-term capital gain $10,000
Bad debt--ordinary loss 6,000 Bad debt-short term
Long-term capital gain capital loss ( 6,000)
net of 50% capital Net long-term capital gain 4,000
gain deduction 5,000 50% capital gain deduction ( 2,000)
Bad debt ordinary loss ( 6,000) $ 2,000
($ 1,000)
It would appear that the wording of Section 183(b) has the purpose of
allowing the maximum deductions up to the gross income of the activity.
Therefore, it appears the taxpayer should compute his allowable deductions
under both methods and select that method which allows the most deduc-
tions up to the point of eliminating any gross income from the activity. The
draftsmen's idea appears clear but the wording of Section 183(b) will lead to
many confusing interpretations. The regulations may not touch on this area
but may instead only emphasize the order in which deductions should be
taken. If so, the regulations will probably direct that those deductions al-
lowable under Section 183(b)(1) be taken first (interest, taxes, etc.) and
then, to the extent there is still gross income, will allow deductions for ex-
penditures deductible only when an activity is engaged in for profit. Of
this second group, the Senate Finance Committee indicated their intent that
the deductions to be allowed first are those involving a basis adjustment such
as depreciation. 58
Except for this language, depreciation in a hobby loss situation would not
have been allowed since the depreciation would not have been incurred ei-
ther in connection with a trade or business or for the production of income.5 9
Now, however, Section 183 allows the depreciation deduction to the extent
these deductions fall under Section 183(b)(2). The question that arises is
58. S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 104 (1969).
59. I.R.C. as amended § 167(a) (1961); see Yanow v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 444
(1965).
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just how does Section 183 fit into the "allowed or allowable" wording under
Section 167. An illustration may help clarify the problem.
Assume that an activity not engaged in for profit produces income of
$10,000, incurs potential depreciation expense in the amount of $9,000 and
has other business expenses of $10,000. Total deductions would only be
allowable to the extent of the $10,000 income, thereby disallowing $9,000 in
deductions. The breakdown of the deductions allowed would be $9,000 of
depreciation expense and $1,000 of the other expenses. Further, assume that
the depreciation expense was incurred on a Section 1245 asset and that it is
sold immediately thereafter for $9,000. Under Section 1245 the taxpayer
would be required to include $9,000 in ordinary income to recapture the
depreciation taken whereas under prior law the other expenses which were
disallowed would have offset the hobby income first and the basis of the
Section 1245 asset would not have been reduced and no gain would have
been recognized. Although in both instances $9,000 of deductions would be
disallowed, under Section 183 the taxpayer has $9,000 of ordinary income or,
in effect, no benefit at all for the depreciation.
Therefore, although Section 183 is basically a "taxpayer provision," it still
has some sting to it.
A Presumption with Problems
The Congress, in trying to make the administration of the new law a bit
more simple or systematic for the Treasury Department, may have opened
a Pandora's box. The presumption contained in the law provides:
If the gross income derived from an activity for 2 or more of the
taxable years in the period of 5 consecutive taxable years which
ends with the taxable year exceeds the deductions attributable to
such activity (determined without regard to whether or not such
activity is engaged in for profit), then, unless the Secretary or his
delegate establishes to the contrary, such activity shall be presumed
for the purposes of this chapter for such taxable year to be an ac-
tivity engaged in for profit. In the case of an activity which con-
sists in major part of the breeding, training, showing, or racing of
horses, the preceding sentence shall be applied by substituting the
period of 7 consecutive taxable years for the period of 5 consecu-
tive taxable years. 60
The presumption as enacted is a rebuttable presumption in favor of the
taxpayer: if gross income exceeds certain deductions in two out of five or
seven years, the activity will be presumed to be engaged in for profit.61
60. I.R.C. as amended § 183(d) (emphasis added).
61. In contrast to the rebuttable presumption in favor of the taxpayer provided in
Section 183(d), it has been suggested that a failure to meet this presumption might act
as a presumption in itself that the taxpayer was not engaged in an activity for profit-
[Vol. 20:716
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This version of the presumption was put forth by the Senate Finance Com-
mittee62 and was accepted by the Conference Committee. 63  The original
House version of the presumption provided for a presumption against the
activity being engaged in for profit if the activity produced losses of $25,000
or more in three out of five years. 64
It should be understood that the "gross profit" test in Section 183 is not a
minimum condition which must be met in order to qualify as an activity en-
gaged in for profit but rather is a condition which, if satisfied, creates a re-
buttable presumption that the activity is indeed an activity engaged in for
profit, and it places the burden of establishing otherwise on the Treasury
Department. The taxpayer who fails to meet this criterion can still qualify
his activity as a business, provided he can show that his operations were con-
ducted with a profit-making motive or intent. With this in mind, it is useful
to examine some of the difficulties which will be encountered in the applica-
tion of the above presumption.
.. which consists in major part ..
For those activities which consist in major part of the breeding, training,
showing, or racing of horses, the period in which gross income must exceed
certain deductions twice is changed from five years to seven years. The
problem with this, of course, is what constitutes "in major part."
Webster's Dictionary defines the word "major" in this way: "the greater
in dignity, rank, importance, or interest."'6 5  The operative word here is
"greater"; however, in returning to the dictionary, "greater" is defined as
"major."66 In going through this circuitous approach it becomes apparent that
"major" should be defined according to its ordinary usage-one-half or
more. It would certainly appear that the regulations will have to take this
fifty or more percent approach. The problem is the choice of the base on
which to apply the fifty percent test. The base could be total assets used in
hence a negative or reverse presumption. In other words, would an Internal Revenue
agent interpret the failure to make a profit in 2 out of 5 or 7 years as a presumption
that the activity was a hobby? This was suggested by Senator Cooper of Kentucky in
his discussion of the provision on the Senate floor. See 115 CoNG. REC. 16,370 (daily
ed. Dec. 10, 1969). Most commentators have agreed that the statute can not be read
as suggested by Senator Cooper. However, they have also expressed the fear that on a
practical basis it may be applied that way by Internal Revenue agents. E.g., Diamond
and Home, Hobby Losses; Miscellaneous Individual and Corporate Problems, 23 TAx
LAWYER 609, 611 (1970); 1969 Tax Reform Law, RESEARCH INST. OF AMERICA, INC. at
112 (1970).
62. S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 102, 104-105 (1969).
63. CONF. REP. No. 91-782, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 298-299 (1969).
64. H.R. REP. No. 13270, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 213(a) (1969) (as passed by the
House of Representatives).
65. WEBSTER'S 3RD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (unabridged) 1363 (1966).
66. Id. at 994.
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the activity, gross income attributable to the activity, deductions attributable
to the activity, or perhaps a three-factor ratio similar to those used by many
states in apportioning income for the purpose of state taxation for those
corporations which have operations both within and without the state.6 7 These
three factor ratios usually include a property factor, sales or income factor,
and an employee or payroll factor. Generally, these three factors produce a
reasonable allocation, and something of this nature should be considered by
the Treasury Department for inclusion in the regulations. Most likely, how-
ever, the Treasury Department will take an approach similar to fifty per-
cent of deductions because of its deceptive ease of application. What could
happen, of course, under this approach is that a taxpayer could make large
capital expenditures for assets with a relatively long life which would not
give rise to substantial current year deductions, while a much smaller ac-
tivity might give rise to larger current deductions if the bulk of its expendi-
tures are for feed, labor and other currently deductible costs. No matter
what test is chosen for the purpose of the administration of the phrase "in
major part" some taxpayers will be adversely affected by it. For this reason,
although the Treasury Department will produce some "rule of thumb" for its
agents to apply, it should not be a strict mechanical rule. The courts will
have the final say as triers of fact. Most likely the courts will ask only one
simple question: Does the activity look more like a work horse than a
hobby horse? If the answer is "yes," the taxpayer uses an overall seven-
year period instead of the normal five-year period in computing income
for the presumption.
deductions attributable to such activity. .
Under prior law there were certain items which were not considered to be
deductions attributable to a trade or business for the purposes of the $50,000
loss test.68 The Congress has not specifically said these items will not be
treated as before, but the implication is there since they were not specifi-
cally excluded in the new statutory provision. The Congress has also listed
the deductibility of certain items without inclusion in the mathematical loss
test as one of the reasons for the change in the law.69 Therefore, although
some of the old reasons for having specially treated deductions still remains,
the legislative intent appears clear. There are, however, at least two deduct-
ible items which will not be used for purposes of computing the presump-
tion's profit test: the net operating loss deduction which was specifically elim-
67. D.C. CODE ANN. 47-1580(a) (1964); CODE VA. ANN. 58.131.2.17 (Michie ed.
1969).
68. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 270.
69. See text accompanying note 34, supra.
[Vol. 20:716
Section 183: Work Horse or Hobby Loss
inated from the computation in the Senate Finance Committee report, 70 and
second, the deduction for capital gains. 71
The treatment of the capital gain deduction was a boon to the taxpayer un-
der prior law. This allowed a taxpayer who could not show a profit from
his normal business operations to sell capital assets or assets which could
qualify for capital gain treatment and have the entire gain included in gross
income while not recognizing the fifty percent capital gain deduction. The
basis for this treatment of capital gains arose from the landmark case of
McDonald v. Commissioner.72 The Tax Court held that one hundred per-
cent of the gain was to be included in gross income in determining the loss
for the purposes of Section 270 although only fifty percent was taxable. In a
Revenue Ruling issued following McDonald, it was expressly stated for the
purposes of Section 270 of the Code, capital gain must be included in full in
gross income and the capital gain deduction of 50 percent of the excess of the
net long-term capital gain over net short-term capital loss does not constitute a
deduction attributable to a trade or business carried on by an individual in
determining whether such deductions for each of five consecutive taxable
years exceeded gross income derived from such trade or business by more
than $50,000. 73
It would appear that since the rationale of McDonald and the above men-
tioned Revenue Ruling is still sound, the same capital gain treatment will be
afforded under Section 183. The prior law used the words "attributable to a
trade or business" while the new law uses the words, "deduction attributable
to such activity". As previously mentioned, the difference between the words
"trade or business" and the word "activity" is purely academic. The drafts-
men could not use the term they were trying to define, so they compromised
on the undefined word "activity." With this in mind, it would seem very diffi-
cult indeed for the Treasury Department not to follow its own precedent and
the precedent of the Tax Court.
Effective Date
Some doubt has been raised as to the manner in which the presumption will
apply and as to which years it will consider. It has been suggested by at least
one commentator that the presumption will consider both pre-1970 years
and post 1969 years. The commentator supports this conclusion by noting
that the lawmakers deleted a specific reference in the law that the presump-
70. S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 105 (1969).
71. I.R.C. as amended § 1202.
72. 23 T.C. 1052 (1955).
73. Rev. Rul. 57-527, 1957-2 CuM. BULL. 222.
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tion would consider all years, past and future. This deletion, he states, was
made since the reference was considered superfluous by the lawmakers. 74 An-
other viewpoint is that to have the presumption act only prospectively from
December 31, 1969 "would have the strange and doubtless unintended result
of delaying the effectiveness of the presumption until 1975 in all cases." 75
In this regard, it could easily be conceded that the normal operation of a pre-
sumption is as an aid in the administration of the law and that no good reason
exists for not applying the presumption to past years in order to allow the pre-
sumption to be fully operative in 1970. Forgetting the practical matters,
the law seems plain on its face. The Senate Finance Committee had origi-
nally written the presumption provision as being "applicable to prior taxable
years. ' 176 However, this reference to prior taxable years for the operation
of the presumption was deleted by the Conference Committee. 77 Implicit
in this deletion had to be the thought that the Conference Committee wanted
the presumption, like the remainder of the section, to be applicable only to
years after December 31, 1969. For some people this was not enough, and
at least one individual decided to go to the source. Former Senator George
A. Smathers78 wrote to Senator Russell B. Long, Chairman of the Senate
Finance Committee, and questioned him on the operation of the presump-
tion. Senator Long replied that the presumption period "would begin run-
ning as of 1970 and not. . . as the Senate bill proposed. .... -79
In considering the plain words of the law and Senator Long's letter, there
appears to be no escape from the fact that the presumption will only operate
prospectively. However, since Section 270 was repealed and Section 183 was
made effective on the same date, December 31, 1969, two strange results
occur. The Section 183 presumption cannot be used for at least two years
and the Section 270 five consecutive years test is inoperative for taxpayers
who began a string of $50,000 or more losses in 1966. Thus no taxpayer
can have the use of the favorable presumption until at least 1972 and to get
it in 1972 the years 1970 and 1971 must be profit years. Similarly, if a tax-
payer has had a yearly loss of $75,000 from his activity for the past four
years and again incurs a $75,000 loss in 1970, these five consecutive years
of $75,000 loss will not operate Section 270 because the fifth of the five
consecutive years was a year after the date of Section 270's repeal.
74. Sharp, New "Hobby Loss" Rule is Tougher but Engaged in for Profit Dilemma
Remains, J. TAX. 290 (1970).
75. Dickinson, 241 T.M., Farm and Ranch Losses, 421 at n.151 (1970).
76. S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 105 (1969).
77. CONF. REP. No. 91-782, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 299 (1969).
78. Former Senator from the state of Florida, now a partner in the Washington, D.C.
firm of Smathers & Merrigan. General counsel for the American Horse Council.
79. Letter from Senator Russel B. Long to George A. Smathers, Mar. 11, 1970, on
file at Catholic University Law Review Office.
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A Draftman's Nightmare
In discussing the ambiguities of the presumption provided in Section 183, one
point should be noted which would constitute a major flaw in the wording of
the provision. The effect of this flaw, for all practical purposes, strikes a
near fatal blow to the newest of the hobby loss provisions.
In order to find this potential flaw, the "deductions allowable" subsec-
tion8 as well as the "presumption" subsection must be reviewed. In the
"deductions allowable" subsection, the words "without regard to whether or
not such activity is engaged in for profit" were construed by the Senate
Committee to mean those deductions which fell into the category of or are
similar to interest, taxes (state and local property taxes), and the capital
gains deduction. 8 These same words are used in the presumption subsection
in describing those deductions which must be exceeded by gross income in
order to operate the presumption in favor of the taxpayer.8 2
The ramifications of this unfortunate choice of wording will not be evident
for some time. However, it does not take a crystal ball to foresee what tack
some taxpayers might take. The taxpayer could argue the quoted phrase
should receive the identical construction in both subsections. The taxpayer
could then argue that since the meaning of that phrase was made clear in the
Senate Finance Committee reports 8 as it relates to "deductions allowable"
and that since no explanation of that phrase exists as it relates to the pre-
sumption, they must be one and the same. If a taxpayer was successful
with this line of argument, the presumption provision would switch from an
administrative aid to an administrative headache. The presumption would
operate to put practically all taxpayers within its semi-protective arms.
The Treasury Department would be in a position which would require it to
overcome the rebuttable presumption as a matter of course. This would
clog the administrative machinery to the point that Congress might have to
rewrite the presumption. Short of this, the regulations will most likely try to
solve the problem. What the regulations most likely will do in this area is
follow the approach the Treasury Department concludes the draftsmen in-
tended to take. That approach will most likely be that the presumption will
operate in a taxpayer's favor if gross income exceeds the deductions attribu-
table to the activity determined as if the activity were engaged in for profit.
Although most observers may agree that the latter is what the draftsmen in-
tended, all observers must agree that this is not what they wrote into the law.
80. I.R.C. as amended § 183(b).
81. S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 104 (1969).
82. I.R.C. as amended § 183(d).
83. S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 104 (1969).
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Profit Intent and Profit As A General Principle of Deductibility
Profit Intent as a pre-requisite for deductibility is common to many Code
sections. There must be a profit intent under Section 162 in order to deduct
ordinary and necessary business expenses. There must be a profit intent
under Section 165(c) in order to deduct losses incurred by an individual.
There must be a profit intent under Sections 212(1) and (2) in order to
deduct non-business expenses incurred for the production or collection of
income or the maintenance of income producing property. There must be
a profit intent under Section 167 in order to deduct depreciation charges.
Profit intent is the sine qua non of deductibility, except as expressly provided
in Section 183.
Since profit intent is not a new idea and since it has been the subject of
voluminous litigation, this comment will not discuss the factors which are
considered in determining a profit intent in general.8 4  What will be dis-
cussed is how the enactment of Section 183 and its legislative history has
effected this vast area of case law.
The Profit Intent and Section 183
Section 183(a), stated in the converse, requires that for deductions attrib-
utable to an activity to be deductible, that activity must be engaged in for
profit. In other words, there must be a "profit intent." However, mere
subjective profit intent is not enough. There must be some outward mani-
festations of this profit intent sufficient to satisfy an objective test.85 A profit
intent test, as a condition for allowance of farm loss deductions, has been a
part of the regulations and case law for a long time. 8 It is this type of
profit intent that Section 183 codified. Section 183 requires that for an ex-
penditure to be deductible under it the taxpayer must first show that the re-
lated activity constitutes a trade or business or is undertaken for the produc-
tion of "income". These requirements were included in Section 183 by in-
corporating all the case law, regulations and rulings by reference, as they
pertain to Section 162 or Sections 212(1) and (2).8 7
Apparently, however, this incorporation by reference was not meant to be
84. An excellent analysis of much of the old case law can be found in Mertens,
Law ol Federal Income Taxation, § 28.72-28.74 (1969) and in Dickinson, 241 T.M.
Farm and Ranch Losses (1970). Both sources outline many factors which have been
considered important in determining a taxpayer's profit intent. Many of these factors
will most likely be included in the forthcoming regulations interpreting Section 183.
85. SeeTreas. Reg. § 1.212-1(c) (1957).
86. See Weir v. Commissioner, 109 F.2d 996 (3d Cir. 1940); Farish v. Commis-
sioner, 36 B.T.A. 1114, 103 F.2d 63 (5th Cir. 1939); Whitney v. Commissioner, 73
F.2d 589 (3d Cir. 1934); Treas. Reg. 118 § 39.23(e)-5 (1953).
87. I.R.C. as amended § 183(c).
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complete. Under prior law, many court cases and the Treasury Department
took the position that the expectation of a profit had to be reasonable. 88
The House apparently tried to codify this view when it included in its version
of Section 183 a denial of deductions "arising from an activity carried on by
him [taxpayer] where the activity was not operated with a reasonable ex-
pectation of realizing a profit from it."89 This test was not well received by
the Senate Finance Committee which expressed many difficulties with it.
The Senate Finance Committee indicated it was in basic agreement with the
approach of the House but it was concerned "that requiring a taxpayer to
have a 'reasonable expectation' of profit may cause losses to be disallowed in
situations where an activity is being carried on as a business rather than as
a hobby."90  To stress this point, the Senate Finance Committee used ex-
amples of an individual who was a bona fide inventor or a person who in-
vests in wildcat oil wells. 91 The Finance Committee indicated it felt the con-
clusion could be reached that these people really had no reasonable expec-
tation of profit when in fact the activity was engaged in for profit. It was
further pointed out that the "reasonable expectation" test might operate
against a poor person who was engaged in an inefficient farming operation.9 2
Accordingly, the Finance Committee modified the House Bill to provide that
in determining whether losses from an activity are to be allowed, the focus is
to be on whether the activity is engaged in for profit.93 Since the Senate's ap-
proach or test was eventually the rule which was accepted by the Confer-
ence Committee 94 and enacted into law, the Finance Committee report on
this point would appear to have particular significance.
The Finance Committee stated that the determination of whether an ac-
tivity is engaged in for profit should be made on an objective rather than a
subjective basis. 95 The Finance Committe thought that although a rea-
sonable expectation of profit is not to be required, the facts and circumstances
would have to indicate that the taxpayer entered the activity, or continued
the activity with the objective of making a profit.96
88. See Blackmon v. United States, 68-2 USTC 9655, 22 AFTR 2d 5860 (N.D. Tex.
1968); Lazonby v. Tomlinson, 272 F. Supp. 558 (N.D. Fla. 1967); Bennet v. United
States, 65-2 USTC 9701, 16 AFTR 2d 5822 (E.D. Va. 1965); G.C.M. 21103, 1939-1
CUM. BULL. 164.
89. H.R. REP. No. 13270, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 213(a) (1969) (as passed by the
House of Representatives); H. R. REP. No. 91-413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 71 (1969).
90. S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 103 (1969).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. CONF. REP. No. 91-782, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 299 (1969).
95. S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 104 (1969).
96. Id.
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From the expressions of the Finance Committee, it would appear the
reasonable expectation of profit test is not completely dead. It will not satisfy
the requirements of Section 183 alone, but it would certainly play a part in the
now required objective fact determination.
On a practical basis, it remains to be seen whether or not a court, which
believes there is a reasonable expectation of profit for the taxpayer's ac-
tivity and is convinced of the taxpayer's subjective profit intent, will use
Section 183 to deny the taxpayer his losses from the activity involved.
What Is This Thing Called Profit?
Most taxpayers and courts have understood a profit to constitute the excess
of income over deductions and have looked to the taxpayer's tax return to
determine whether or not a profit had been made. However, some tax-
payers have sought to expand this definition of profit to include consideration
of the entire economic status of the activity. One of the main items usually
pointed to in this regard is the unrealized appreciation of the activity's assets.
In Blake v. Commissioner,97 one of the earliest cases to consider unrealized
appreciation, the taxpayer sustained losses in operating a horse farm for 12
consecutive years. The court in allowing the taxpayer's loss deductions ap-
peared to place great weight on the taxpayer's testimony that the real estate
holding of his farm and his horses had appreciated substantially in valueY8
In the subsequent cases of Ellsworth v. Commissioner9  and Estate of Lillian
Soloman v. Commissioner,100 the tax court gave considerable weight to the
appreciation factor in the taxpayer's breeding herd. The court in Ells-
worth, in the light of 13 years of consecutive losses, cited the testimony of
three expert witnesses as "convincing" on the fact that a profit could be rea-
lized if the taxpayer were to sell his herd.101
This "economic profit" concept has apparently been accepted by the
Treasury Department since in its statement of position on the Tax Reform
Act it recommended to the Senate Finance Committee that it be made clear
that the hobby loss provision contemplated an economic profit. 10 2
Although the Finance Committee did not make this clear, the reasoning
of the court cases in this area cannot be ignored. Therefore, it would appear
that the forthcoming regulations should include a reference to this "eco-
97. 38 B.T.A. 1457 (1938).
98. Id. at 1460.
99. 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 145 (1962).
100. 26 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 919 (1967).
101. 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 145, 151 (1962).
102. Hearings on H.R. 13270 Before the Comm. on Finance, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.,
807 (1969).
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nomic profit" concept. Should the Treasury Department choose not to in-
clude this concept in its regulations, taxpayers still will most certainly continue
to use this line of argument in subsequent court cases. When the taxpayer
can show the requisite asset appreciation it would certainly appear the tax-
payer will continue to be successful in this assertion.
Conclusion
The Congress in trying to codify an objective approach to the entire hobby
loss problem while repealing the previous mechanical approach may have
temporarily set the Treasury Department back a few paces. This, of course,
must be assumed to be the intention of Congress, since it provided a favor-
able presumption for the taxpayer. It is also clear from the conflict in the
House and Senate Bills that one of the Treasury Department approaches in
determining when a hobby exists has been eliminated. But it is unlikely
that Congress intended to set the Treasury Department as far back as it has.
Before the enactment of Section 183, the Treasury Department was regu-
larly using Sections 165, 162, and 212(1) and (2) to attack situations in
which it felt taxpayers were operating an activity for pleasure rather than
profit and offsetting other income with losses generated by the pleasure
operations. Undoubtedly, this approach will continue to be taken by the
Treasury Department with whatever slight modifications it deems necessary.
The problem is that much of the Treasury Department's time will now be
spent trying to convince taxpayers and courts that its approach is correct.
They must contend with all the normal problems attending the codification
of volumninous case law as well as the problems created by the provision's
special features. It would certainly appear that the Treasury Department
would have been happier with the repeal of Section 270 alone, without any
Congressional attempt to codify the hobby loss case law into a new hobby
loss provision.
In hobby loss cases now, the Treasury Department is forced to overcome
the legal ambiguities of Section 183 by arguing the purpose and the intent
of the law before embarking on the arduous job of arguing the facts.
Thomas A. Condon
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